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Beginning in 1982, an epidemic of balance of payments crises caused
a number of governments to adopt exchange controls as a prescription
for dealing with the payment demands of foreign creditors. Although the
exchange controls themselves tended to be complex, their goal was sim-
ple: to prevent the outflow of scarce foreign exchange, and therefore to
improve the country's balance of payments. The tightening of exchange
controls in many countries also produced a mild epidemic of a different
sort: a rash of exchange control cases in United States courts, in which
creditors have sought to enforce an obligation against a debtor who pro-
fessed inability to pay because of exchange restrictions imposed by the
debtor's home government. These cases have raised questions concerning
the extent to which a court in the United States should give effect to the
exchange control regulations of another country. In winding their ways
through the courts of the United States, the exchange control cases have
caused intermittent confusion and have tested the utility of basic legal
theories.
The purpose of this article is to assess the "state of the art" in the
application of legal theories by which a court may be convinced to give
effect to foreign exchange controls in a lawsuit brought in the United
States. The phrase "state of the art," as used here, should not be under-
stood to carry the same connotation that the term does in the sciences
or engineering, where it describes the most advanced equipment available
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on the market. Nothing particularly modern or advanced is involved in
the application of traditional legal doctrines to the cases at hand; the
courts have not pushed legal doctrine to new heights of precise analysis.
After a period of confusing and even contradictory positions by different
courts, however, a pattern of decisions has begun to develop in exchange
control cases, giving some outline to the imperfect art of legal doctrine
in this area of the law.
I. Characterizing the Exchange Control Cases
The cases under consideration here have tested the wisdom of U.S.
courts for several reasons. First, the intangible nature of the property at
issue (the debt) creates confusion in locating the situs of the affected
property-an important consideration given the various territorial theo-
ries that underlie the doctrines at issue. Second, the indeterminate nature
of the exchange control measure itself-is it permissible regulation, or is
it an uncompensated expropriation?-raises questions concerning the pre-
cise effect of the government action. Third, the transaction that gives rise
to the debt commonly involves elements of performance in two or more
jurisdictions, raising conflicts of policy as well as conflicts of law. Finally,
since the exchange control cases have arisen in the context of balance of
payments crises-matters of serious governmental concern-the conflicts
of policy, wherever they occur, are apt to be taken very seriously.
The exchange control cases considered here involve debts that fall
loosely into two categories, with variations in each category.'
A. FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
When the creditor-debtor relationship arises out of a purely financial
transaction, the following kinds of cases predominate:
Case 1-A U.S. bank makes a loan to a foreign borrower (sovereign
or otherwise), and sues to enforce the loan after exchange controls
prevent the borrower from acquiring foreign exchange to service the
debt.2
Case 2-A U.S. depositor deposits dollars with a foreign bank; the
adoption of exchange controls by the foreign government prevents the
depositor from withdrawing the funds in dollars; instead, the account
is converted to local currency and the depositor suffers an exchange
1. The characterizations of Cases I through 5 are taken from Note, The Act of State
Doctrine: Resolving Debt Silas Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 614-16 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Allied Bank lnt'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
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rate loss; the depositor brings suit against the foreign bank in a U.S.
court.
3
Case 3-A foreign depositor places funds in a U.S. bank; the foreign
government, through expropriation or other action, asserts ownership
of the accounts. 4
Case 4-A depositor (U.S. or foreign) places funds in the foreign
branch office of a U.S. bank; when the foreign government seizes the
assets, 5 or prohibits their withdrawal under the authority of exchange
control,6 the depositor sues to claim payment from the home office of
the bank, which is not subject to the controls. 7
B. INTERNATIONAL SALES TRANSACTIONS
When the debtor-creditor relationship arises out of an international sale
of goods, giving rise to a debt in favor of the exporter, two types of cases
predominate:
Case 5-A foreign government expropriates property owned by one
of its own citizens, then sells the property for export to the United
States; the former owner leaves the foreign country and comes to the
United States to attach the proceeds (accounts receivable) of the sale
of the expropriated property.8
Case 6-A U.S. seller exports goods to a foreign buyer, and the
imposition of exchange controls prevents the foreign buyer from making
3. See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987); Grass v.
Credito Mexicano, S.A., 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1575 (1987);
Riedel v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d 587 (5th Cir. 1986); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101
(5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, 589 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Braka
v. Bancomer, 589 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); aff'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Frankel
v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., No. 82 Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983).
4. See, e.g., Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) (deposits maintained in the United States).
5. See, e.g., Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2nd Cir. 1984); Perez
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463 N.E.2d 5, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 968
(1984); cf. Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 623 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Mich. 1985), appeal
docketed, No. 86-1258 (6th Cir.).
6. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
7. A complete discussion of the liability of the home office of a U.S. bank for deposits
placed in overseas branches goes beyond the scope of this article. See generally Heininger,
Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed in Their Foreign Branches, I I LAW. & POL.
INT'L Bus. 903 (1982); Leech, International Banking: Effects of Nationalizations and Ex-
change Controls, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET L. 123, 124-38 (1986); Logan & Kantor,
Deposits at Expropriated Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks, 1982 ILL. L. REV. 1333 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Tabacalera Severiano Jorge,
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
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payment. The U.S. seller then sues the buyer for failure to make
payment. 9
In most of these cases, the defendant is a debtor (or, if a bank, the
holder of a deposit) who attempts to defend an action brought by a creditor.
In addition to any other defenses arising under the applicable law for the
contract, three principal defenses, based on well-established legal doc-
trines, are theoretically available to the debtor to defeat these claims. In
the interests of doctrinal purity, 10 they will be discussed in the following
order:
• Sovereign Immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976.11
" Application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF Articles of
Agreement. 12
" The Act of State Doctrine.
Because of a wealth of legal commentary on the principal defenses,
there is no need here to present a complete discussion of these doctrines.
The reader who is interested in a more general discussion of each doctrine
should consult the sources listed in the first footnote to each of the fol-
lowing sections.
9. Examples of this case are rare, even though exchange restrictions often disrupt trans-
actions for the international sale of goods. Exchange control defenses do arise in other
contexts of litigation over international sales of goods. See, e.g., John Sanderson & Co.
(Wool) Pty. v. Ludlow Jute, 569 F.2d 696 (lst Cir. 1978) (involving claim by buyer arising
under contract for sale of jute, where contract allegedly violated Indian exchange controls).
10. Logically, one should start with a consideration of defenses based on lack of juris-
diction-an assertion of sovereign immunity, or lack of in personam jurisdiction-since a
finding favorable to the defendant will render unnecessary an examination of other defenses
based on the type of action. 1 RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 469 reporter's note II (Tent. Draft No. 6, April 12, 1985) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED)].
The second defense in the hierarchy is that based on article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF
Agreement, since that provision is controlling over a contrary disposition under the act of
state doctrine. See Second Amendment to Articles of Agreement of the International Mon-
etary Fund, April 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter Articles of
Agreement]; Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1201
(N.Y. 1982) (Meyer, J., dissenting); Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XIX, 31 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 179, 198 (Mar. 1984).
Finally, if all else fails, the defendant can assert a defense based on the act of state
doctrine. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra, § 469, reporter's
note II.
After these three defenses have been disposed of, one should logically turn to contractual
defenses, such as force majeure. At least one commentator has argued for the application
of force majeure principles to cases such as those considered here. Comment, Exchange
Controls and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure as an Alternative Defense, 71 IowA
L. REV. 1499 (1986).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (3), (4), 1391(b), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
12. Articles of Agreement, supra note 10.
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II. Sovereign Immunity Defenses to Jurisdiction in Cases
Involving the Adoption of Exchange Controls That
Prevent Payment of a Foreign DebtW
Where the defendant is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign gov-
ernment, the plaintiff-creditor is likely to face a motion to dismiss on
grounds that the defendant is entitled to immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The following discussion focuses on
the principal exceptions to sovereign immunity that will operate to pre-
clude the assertion of immunity: the waiver exception, the commercial
activity exception, and the expropriation exception.
A. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
In most international financial transactions, and in many nonfinancial
transactions as well, the defense of sovereign immunity is not available
to the debtor. Under the FSIA a foreign state will not be immune when
it has waived its immunity either expressly or by implication. 14 Express
waivers are common in international lending transactions, although they
are not common in the case of international bond issues. 15 Such a waiver
will dispose of the defense in most banking cases involving sovereign
debtors. When the "debtor" is a government-owned bank that has re-
ceived a foreign deposit, however, a waiver of immunity is not likely to
be found, either expressly or impliedly, in the deposit agreement to which
most depositors are required to adhere. In this situation, the depositor
lacks the leverage to require a waiver of immunity by a government-
owned bank that takes the deposit. The bank will therefore assert im-
munity from suit in a Case 2 scenario.
13. See generally J. STEVENSON, 1. BROWNE & L. DAMROSCH, UNITED STATES LAW OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (1983);
Crockett, Choice of Law Aspects of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 14 L.
& POL. INT'L Bus. 1041 (1983); Kahale, State Loan Transactions: Foreign Law Restrictions
on Waivers of Immunity and Submissions to Jurisdiction, 37 Bus. LAW. 1549 (1982); Kane,
Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Mc-
Cormick, The Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Act
of State Doctrine, 16 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 477 (1984); Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity
and Commercial Activity, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1440 (1983); Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign
Governments: A Comprehensive Review of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 VAND.
J. TRANS. L. 119 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Governments].
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982).
15. Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 319,
344 (1985); Rendell, Allied Bank and Its Aftermath, 20 INT'L LAW. 819. 820 (1986).
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B. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
Due to the commercial nature of the transaction in which most exchange
control cases arise, the commercial activity exception in the FSIA 16 pre-
vents application of the defense of sovereign immunity. 17 Yet several cases
have shown that courts can easily be confused as to what constitutes the
"commercial activity" under examination, a key point in the application
of the exception. Even when the activity involved is a loan of money-
clearly recognized as commercial activity'$-several courts have dis-
missed the action on the grounds that the imposition of exchange control
is inherently a governmental act and the sovereign defendant is therefore
immune from suit.19 Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
clarified this point in Callejo v. Bancomer20 (a Case 2 example), holding
that sovereign immunity depends on the nature of the defendant's acts,
not those of a separate government agency; the defendant does not acquire
"derivative immunity" by virtue of being a separate governmental
agency. 21 Nevertheless, future cases promise to offer confusion whenever
the debtor is a government agency that is closely linked to the entity from
which the exchange control or other debilitating act originates. 22
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982) reads:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case-. . .(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States;...
17. But see De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.
1985) (issuance by Central Bank of dollar check on which payment was stopped was not a
commercial activity, but a governmental act of regulating the sale of foreign exchange).
18. See J. STEVENSON, 1. BROWNE & L. DAMROSCH, supra note 13, at 69-72, and au-
thorities cited therein.
19. Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, No. 82 Civ. 6457 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983);
Callejo v. Bancomer, CA-3-82-1604-D (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 1984) (order of dismissal), aff'd
on other grounds, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
20. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 1109; accord West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 825-26 (9th
Cir. 1987); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1469 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762
F.2d 222 (2nd Cir. 1985).
22. Cf. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 61 i
(1983) (equitable principles may require a presumption of separateness of government ageni-
cies to be discarded; U.S. bank defendant allowed to apply a setoff due from one government
agency against a claim brought by another); see Note, Piercing the Veil of Foreign Trade
Organizations, 23 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 483 (1985).
The blurring of distinctions between government agencies, which worked to the detriment
of the foreign sovereign in First National City Bank, could be used as a shield in FSIA
cases when the agency being sued wishes to hide behind the clearly governmental act of
another government entity.
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The commercial activity exception applies only if a nexus is established
between the activity complained of and the United States. The outer limits
of this requirement occur when the activity is based on an act performed
outside the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States. 23 The Supreme Court has not yet defined the content of the direct
effect requirement, although it appears to be a lower hurdle for the plaintiff
to jump than the due process/minimum contacts requirement to establish
in personam jurisdiction.
For instance, in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria24 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that financial
loss suffered by a U.S. corporation satisfies the direct effect requirement,
at least when the defendant was required to present documents and receive
payment in the United States. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Callejo v. Bancomer, cited Texas Trading in holding that the direct effect
requirement could be met even when the place of payment was arguably
outside of the United States. In support of this conclusion, the court
stressed that the effects in the United States were foreseeable to the
defendants who had solicited plaintiff's business here. 25 In other words,
the court in Callejo incorporated into the FSIA analysis a factor, fore-
seeability, that has been more commonly used in analyzing due process/
minimum contacts requirements to establish in personam jurisdiction. 26
Yet other courts have refused to recognize direct effects when the de-
fendant could foresee that products involved in the dispute were destined
for the United States. 27 Nevertheless, a U.S. creditor that wishes to sue
its debtor in a U.S. court will likely fulfill the direct effect requirement
by the combination of the creditor's corporate "citizenship" in the United
States, coupled with a debt clearly payable in the United States, especially
if other incidents pointing to the foreseeability of such a suit in the United
States are added.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), cl. 3 (1982). For a discussion of direct effects, see J. STE-
VENSON, I. BROWNE & L. DAMROSCH, supra note 13, at 73-75.
24. 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
25. 764 F.2d at I111-12.
In Jerushan Corp. v. Banco Mexicano Somex, No. 83 Civ. 2431 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1986),
the commercial activity consisted of the sale of certificates of deposit, payable either in
Mexico or New York, that had been purchased by Mexican buyers and endorsed to a
Netherlands Antilles corporation. Despite the more tenuous contacts with the United States
than existed in Callejo, the court held that the direct effect requirement of the FSIA was
satisfied. id.
26. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-99 (1980).
27. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979).
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C. THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION
An exception to sovereign immunity also exists under the FSIA when
rights in property taken in violation of international law are also in issue. 28
The applicability of this exception in exchange control cases is limited by
decisions holding that exchange controls do not constitute a "taking."
For example, in West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 29 a Case 2 ex-
ample, plaintiffs had deposited dollars in a Mexican bank, which subse-
quently converted the dollar accounts to pesos in accordance with exchange
controls. Plaintiffs argued that the application of exchange controls
amounted to an unlawful taking in violation of international law. The court
found that this allegation was "substantial and nonfrivolous." Since rights
in intangible property are as capable of confiscation as are rights in tangible
property, 30 the court held that plaintiffs established a claim that brought
the case under the "takings exception" and that, correspondingly, the
court properly had jurisdiction under the FSIA. 3 1
The plaintiff's victory was short-lived, however. The court, after a full
discussion of the expropriation claim, held that the exchange controls in
question, although they clearly diminished the value of plaintiffs' property
rights, did not constitute a "taking" under international law. 32 In other
words, the court used the FSIA's expropriation exception to launch a full
discussion of the expropriation claim, but held that the claim should be
denied when government regulation, such as exchange control, was not
so grossly unfair or confiscatory as to amount to a taking. Nevertheless,
the court held out the possibility that exchange controls could be so
unreasonable or unfair as to justify a contrary result in an appropriate
case.33
Finally, the expropriation exception will be of little help to foreign
citizens who sue in U.S. courts alleging expropriations of property by
their own governments. In De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply this exception to a
dispute between a Nicaraguan national and her own government, since
disputes between governments and their citizens usually lie outside the
ambit of international law. 34
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982). This section also requires that the property be present
in the United States, or that it be owned by an agency that is engaged in commercial activity
in the United States. See generally Note, Jurisdiction over Foreign Governments, supra
note 13, at 146-51.
29. 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987).
30. Id. at 829-31.
31. Id. at 826.
32. Id. at 831-33; see also infra note 106 and accompanying text.
33. 807 F.2d at 832.
34. 770 F.2d 1385, 1395-98 (5th Cir. 1985). The court also refused to apply the tortious
activity exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982), to plaintiff's claim of conversion of prop-
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III. Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the IMF Agreement 35
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF Agreement provides:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which
are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the terri-
tories of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate
in measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either
member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are con-
sistent with this Agreement.
This provision, which is controlling on both state and federal courts in
the United States, 36 was adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference in
1944 precisely for the purpose of providing support, via international
judicial recognition, for the enforcement of exchange control regulations
that are adopted by IMF member countries consistently with the IMF
Agreement. While the provision does not provide a theory for positive
enforcement of such regulations in the United States, 37 it allows a measure
of judicial recognition that, if applicable, will bar a creditor from enforcing
a contractual debt when the exchange controls of the debtor's country
would prohibit such payment.
The obvious question in the context of the debt cases is: Why has not
this provision, mandatory on all courts in the United States, provided an
effective shield for debtors? Despite the apparent relevance to the cases
discussed here, there is not a single instance in which a U.S. court has
given effect to the provision. Not only has article VIII, section 2(b) failed
to accomplish the result the foreign debtor nations would have liked to
achieve (protection of scarce foreign exchange resources from the claims
of foreign creditors), the provision appears to have been of so little con-
sequence that only a minority of the exchange control cases cited in this
article even mention it, and then usually just to dismiss its application.
erty, since this was merely a restatement of its claim under the expropriation exception.
Id. at 1398-99.
35. See generally Articles of Agreement, supra note 10; R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COLLABORATION 477-90 (1985); J GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS
passim (vol. 1, 1962; vol. 2, 1982; vol. 3, 1986); F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY
372-401 (4th ed. 1982); Williams, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange Control Regu-
lations under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1975);
Note, The Unenforceability of International Contracts Violating Foreign Exchange Regu-
lations: Article VIll, Section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 25 VA.
J. INT'L L. 967 (1985).
36. In addition to the fact that the IMF Agreement is an international treaty to which the
United States has adhered, this conclusion is compelled by the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-286k (1982 & Supp. 1 1983, Supp. 11 1984) (§ 11 of the Act gives
article VIII, § 2(b) "full force and effect in the United States and its Territories and
possessions").
37. Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Corp., 190 N.E.2d 235, 237 (N.Y.
1963).
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Courts in the United States appear reluctant to give effect to a provision
that could be used as a shield by debtors, and thus might be viewed as
weakening the integrity of U.S. financial markets. Consequently, U.S.
courts have followed a narrow reading of each element of article VIII,
section 2(b).
A. NARROW INTERPRETATION OF "EXCHANGE CONTRACTS"
The primary reason for U.S. courts' failure to apply article VIII, section
2(b) involves a narrow reading of the phrase "exchange contracts." If a
transaction between a creditor and a debtor cannot be deemed an ex-
change contract, then the provision does not apply. U.S. courts have
taken such a narrow view of the term38 that it appears as if U.S. judges
believe the phrase was intended to apply only to black market exchanges
of crisp dollar bills for wads of foreign currency.
For example, in a Case 1 type of transaction, the court in Libra Bank
held that "a contract to borrow U.S. currency, which requires repayment
in U.S. currency, and which designates New York as the situs of repay-
ment, is not an exchange contract within the meaning of Article VIII,
Section 2(b)." 39 This was true even though the Costa Rican borrower
naturally would be required by circumstances to exchange local currency
for dollars to comply with the contract. Similarly, a Case 6 type of trans-
action involving sale of goods is likely to be viewed by a U.S. court as
falling outside the provision. 40
A broader interpretation of "exchange contract" has been followed by
some European courts, and has been urged by some commentators in the
United States. 4 1 Among the latter are those who argue that an "exchange
contract" can be any kind of contract, including one for the sale of goods,
as long as it "involves the currency of any member." 42 Other experts
argue that an exchange contract is any contract that affects the exchange
resources of the member country whose currency is involved. 4 3 Sir Joseph
38. R. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 485.
39. 570 F. Supp. 870, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
40. See, e.g., Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Corp., 190 N.E.2d 235, 236
(N.Y. 1963) (contract for the export of coffee; payment to exporter in dollars in violation of
Brazilian exchange controls held not to involve an exchange contract). See also RESTATE-
MENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 822 reporter's note 2.
41. The positions of European and American courts are discussed in F. MANN, supra
note 35, at 385-91, and in Note, supra note 35, at 976-95.
42. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 487-88. Professor Edwards "is one of the few
persons who recommend a broad reading of 'exchange contracts' to encompass all contracts,
but a restrictive reading of 'involve the currency,' " Id. at 488. See also infra notes 63-70
and accompanying text.
43. Williams, supra note 35, at 344.
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Gold, a leading commentator in this field, has criticized the narrow reading
of "exchange contracts," 44 and takes the position that an exchange con-
tract should be any contract that calls for international payments or
transfers. 45
Although Judge Meyer, dissenting in Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi,46 is sympathetic to a broad interpretation of exchange
contract, no court in the United States has adopted such a view. Absent
a more definite interpretation in this regard by the Executive Board of
the Fund, U.S. courts are not likely to change their narrow reading of
exchange contracts. Rather, U.S. courts, like their British counterparts, 47
are apt to apply article VIII, section 2(b) only to contracts that have as
their immediate object the exchange of one currency for another. Even
when it is clear that a party will have to exchange a currency to comply
with a contract (as when a foreign borrower will have to acquire U.S.
dollars to repay a U.S. bank creditor), the U.S. courts will not conclude
that an exchange contract is involved. 48 This creditor-oriented view may
be seen to strengthen U.S. financial markets, but it does not necessarily
accord with the goal of international monetary cooperation that the Fund
Agreement was intended to foster.
B. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(b) DOES NOT APPLY TO
CONTRACTS THAT WERE LEGAL WHEN ENTERED INTO,
BUT WHICH LATER BECOME "ILLEGAL" BY THE ADOPTION
OF EXCHANGE CONTROLS
Even if a transaction does involve an exchange contract, a court may
not be willing to apply article VIII, section 2(b) to a contract that was
44. Gold, "Exchange Contracts," Exchange Control and the IMF Articles ofAgreement:
Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 33 INT. & COMP. L.Q.
777 (984).
45. Sir Joseph Gold has summarized his views on this point in 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35,
at 787-801.
46. 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (N. Y. 1982) (suit to enforce payment of a note payable in
New York in Swiss francs held not to involve an exchange contract). For a discussion of
Weston, see infra notes 56-62. See also the comments on Judge Meyer's views in Weston
Banking Corporation in 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 74-78.
47. Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, (1976] 2 W.L.R. 418, 424 (C.A.), [1976] I
All E.R. 817, 822. The House of Lords approved the narrow interpretation of Terruzzi in
United Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039, [1982]
2 All E.R. 720, but qualified the interpretation by noting that the courts should look at the
substance of the contract, and should not enforce a "monetary action in disguise." [1982]
2 W.L.R. at 1050, [19821 2 All E.R. at 729. The English cases are discussed in Note, supra
note 35, at 981-88.
48. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 900
(S.D.N.Y. 1983): "[a] contract to borrow United States currency, which requires repayment
in United States currency, and which designates New York as the situs of repayment, is
not an exchange contract ......
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legal when entered into, but became unenforceable by an intervening
exchange control regulation. Thus, in Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional
de Costa Rica exchange controls were adopted after the loan agreement
had been made, and as a result the debtor failed to make payment. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that "assuming
arguendo that the loan agreement is an exchange contract, defendant has
submitted no authority for its view that a contract, valid and enforceable
when made, may be rendered unenforceable by an intervening currency
regulation. Indeed, there is authority in support of the contrary view." 49
The court specifically declined to follow the views of Sir Joseph Gold in
this regard. 50
As Sir Joseph has pointed out, "[t]he refusal to apply Article VIII,
Section 2(b) to exchange control regulations that affect executory con-
tracts in existence when the regulations are imposed would ignore the
economic difficulties that make the regulations necessary." 51 In the great
majority of cases governments adopt exchange controls precisely because
the balance of payments position of the country cannot support the level
of international payments contracted for. Yet, according to the approach
of Libra Bank, these governments cannot ask for immediate cooperation
from foreign courts, even though the exchange controls may be sanctioned
by the IMF.
C. EXCHANGE CONTROLS MUST BE "MAINTAINED OR IMPOSED
CONSISTENTLY WITH [THE IMF] AGREEMENT," AND THE PARTY
ARGUING FOR APPLICATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(B) HAS
THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THIS ISSUE
In Libra Bank, the court also held that article VIII, section 2(b) should
not be given effect when the defendant fails to meet the burden of proof
that the exchange control regulations were maintained or imposed con-
sistently with the IMF Agreement. The court held that a "defendant's
simple statement hardly suffices to demonstrate consistency with the Fund
Agreement." 52 Demonstrating consistency with the Fund Agreement is a
difficult endeavor, because the Fund's views concerning compliance of
its members are not generally available to the public. 53
49. Id. (citing several cases); accord F. MANN, supra note 35, at 377-78.
50. 570 F. Supp. at 900-01 n.6.
51. 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 69-70. In agreement is Williams, supra note 35, at 364-
67.
52. 570 F. Supp. at 901.
53. See Zamora, Exchange Control in Mexico: A Case Study in the Application of IMF
Rules, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 103 (1984). See also 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 633-58.
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Libra Bank teaches that there must at least be a prima facie showing
that the regulations are consistent with the IMF Agreement. One way of
meeting this requirement is to request advice directly from the IMF con-
cerning the consistency of specified exchange control regulations with the
Fund's articles. 54 At least one court in the United States has indicated
that such advice from the Fund will be taken as controlling."
D. THE TRANSACTION MUST BE CONTRARY TO
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS
One of the more curious analyses of article VIII, section 2(b) appears
in Weston Banking v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi.56 In that case a Panamanian
bank sued to enforce a note payable in New York in Swiss francs. The
Turkish Government adopted exchange control regulations requiring the
restructuring of such debts before it would release foreign exchange to
the Turkish debtor to repay the note. 57 The plaintiff never agreed to
restructuring of the debt, but instead sought to enforce the note as written.
The defendant, among other things, argued that Turkish exchange control
regulations prohibited repayment without restructuring.
The New York Court of Appeals appeared to assume that the note was
an exchange contract. 58 However, it held that article VIII, section 2(b)
was inapplicable to a situation in which "there is no proof ... that if the
debt were not restructured, the bank would be barred from repaying the
plaintiff in Swiss francs as required by the terms of the note." 59 Unfor-
tunately, the court gave no clear explanation for reasoning so. The court
might have been thinking that the contract did not "involve the currency
of any member," but this appears unlikely.60 More likely, the court may
54. 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 646-58.
55. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1120 (5th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 83-
85, 130-33 and accompanying text.
56. 446 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 1982).
57. Those familiar with the Mexican debt experience will see a marked similarity here
to the Ficorca program. See Zamora, Peso-Dollar Economics and the Imposition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in Mexico, 32 AM. J. ComP. L. 99, 137-40 (1984).
58. The loan was made in Swiss francs, to be repaid in Swiss francs, but the exchange
control regulations required the Turkish borrower to transfer the foreign currency to the
Central Bank in exchange for Turkish lira. The case centered on the Central Bank's refusal
to make Swiss francs available to the borrower unless the loan was restructured. Without
deciding specifically that this involved an "exchange contract," the court noted that the
promissory note "obligated the defendant to repay the plaintiff the principal sum loaned in
Swiss francs and not Turkish lira." 442 N.E.2d at 1200. The court intimated that an outright
ban on payment in foreign currencies might have brought the case under article VIII, section
2(b). Id.
59. 442 N.E.2d at 1200.
60. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 486-89. See also infra notes 62-70 and accom-
panying text.
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have been convinced that the contract was not "contrary to" the exchange
control regulations, since the Turkish Government did not impose a per
se ban on payment, but simply "permitted" a Turkish bank to restructure
its debt. The court appeared to assume, probably erroneously, that the
Turkish Government would have made foreign exchange available for
payment of nonrestructured debt. 61
Both the outcome, and the reasoning, of Weston Banking are question-
able. Article VIII, section 2(b) does not require that the exchange control
regulations must necessarily amount to restrictions, i.e., that they must
prohibit payment, before the provision will apply. It is enough that an
exchange contract be contrary to the exchange control regulations of the
member whose currency is involved; if so, the contract should be unen-
forceable in a U.S. court. A prima facie showing that a transaction violates
exchange controls should be enough for a court to refuse enforcement.
Weston Banking can only be explained by concluding that the defendant
failed to make even a prima facie showing that payment to the foreign
creditor would violate exchange controls. In the words of one commen-
tator, the reasoning of Weston Banking "seems somewhat strained; how-
ever, policy considerations clearly favour that decision." 62 This conclusion
is correct if one agrees with the general policy that contracts such as this
should always be enforceable as to their terms. The statement is more
questionable if one considers the rationale behind the adoption of article
VIII, section 2(b), which is to give a measure of extraterritorial effect to
exchange controls.
E. PRINCIPLES OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE ANALYSIS OF
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(B): THE EXCHANGE CONTRACT MUST
"INvOLVE THE CURRENCY" OF THE MEMBER
One of the requirements for the application of article VIII, section 2(15)
is that the contract "involve the currency" of a member country. This
criterion seems to have been incorporated in order to ensure that there
be an acceptable basis for legislative jurisdiction in applying exchange
controls to the transaction in question, much as the test of extraterrito-
riality defines the acceptable scope of government action under the act
of state doctrine. 63
61. 442 N.E.2d at 1200 reads: "[T]here is no proof, in this record, that if the debt were
not restructured, the bank would be barred from repaying the plaintiff in Swiss francs as
required by the terms of the note."
62. Rendell, Borrower Liable Despite Exchange Controls, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1983,
at 47, 48.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 121-36.
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A good deal of confusion exists regarding the range of transactions that
involve the currency of a member, in part because so few courts have
passed on the question. 64 Courts in the United States have tended to lump
this consideration into the analysis of "exchange contract." Most scholars
tend to favor a test based on economic effects. According to one com-
mentator,65 the basic test is (a) whether the contract is entered into by a
member country or by a resident of that member, or (b) whether the
contract deals with assets situated within the member's territory. Another
expert66 has argued that a currency is "involved" if the contract (a)
contains an express or implied term providing for that currency as the
currency of payment, or (b) the payment or transfer of that currency is
in fact necessary to the performance of the contract. Sir Joseph Gold
takes the position that a currency is involved if the member's balance of
payments would be affected by the payment or transfer called for under
the contract. 6 7
The permissible extraterritorial reach of exchange control regulations
has also not been clearly defined under international law, and this uncer-
tainty is reflected in the requirement that an exchange contract "involve
the currency." 68 As we shall see in the discussion below, notions of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction play an important role in the analysis of act of state
cases. No U.S. court has decided the extent to which it will give effect
to exchange control regulations that purport to regulate nonresident par-
ties, or assets held outside of the regulating country's territory. 69 Judge
Meyer, in a dissenting opinion in Weston Banking Corporation, would
have held that a note payable in New York in Swiss francs by a Turkish
debtor should be deemed to "involve the currency" of Turkey-in effect,
giving extraterritorial effect to the Turkish exchange controls. 70 Given the
reluctance of U.S. courts to take a broad view of the application of article
VIII, section 2(b), however, other judges are unlikely to follow this view.
One thing is certain: as financial markets become increasingly linked
electronically, more courts will have to wrestle with the extraterritorial
reach of exchange control regulations.
64. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 486-89.
65. Williams, supra note 35, at 349.
66. R. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 488.
67. 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 789. Professor Mann appears to favor the same inter-
pretation. F. MANN, supra note 35, at 391-92.
68. Williams, supra note 35, at 350.
69. Id.
70. 442 N.E.2d at 1203.
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IV. The Act of State Doctrine 71
The flurry of exchange control cases has reinvigorated the act of state
doctrine, but these cases have also made the doctrine more confusing. A
majority of the cases cited here have involved at least some discussion
of the act of state doctrine. As already noted, three factors have contrib-
uted to the confusion: the intangible nature of the property interests in-
volved, the international nature of the transactions, and the strength of
divergent governmental interests.
The most often-cited statement of the act of state doctrine is that which
appears in Justice Harlan's opinion in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino:72
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within
its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of the suit, in the absence of treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.
Sabbatino involved the expropriation of property by a foreign state, as
do many of the act of state cases that have been decided by the courts.
However, the doctrine has been applied to prevent reexamination of gov-
ernmental acts other than expropriation, 73 including the act of imposing
exchange controls. 74 Act of state is a federal law doctrine that is equally
controlling on state and federal courts, and is reviewable by the Supreme
Court. 75
Three basic theories have been variously mentioned by the courts to
support the doctrine: it emanates from basic notions of state sovereignty;
it is an extension of the principle of international comity; and it is dictated
by a respect for the separation of powers. 76 As with the political question
doctrine, the effect of applying the act of state doctrine is to render
71. See generally C. EBENROTH, BANKING ON THE ACT OF STATE (1985); Bazyler, Abol-
ishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986); Note, The Act of State
Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A New Focus for
a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1985); Note, The Act of State Doctrine:
Resolving the Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1986); Note, The Resolution
of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Resolution of Act of State Disputes]; Comment, Applying an
Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 TEX. INT. L.J. 547 (1983).
72. 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
73. See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (allegation of tort commited
by foreign government official, dismissal on act of state grounds).
74. See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 469, com-
ment g (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 425).
76. Note, The Act of State Doctrine and Allied Bank, 31 VILL. L. REV. 291, 298-302
(1986).
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nonjusticiable disputes arising out of the act in question, even if the court
has jurisdiction over the parties. Despite its longevity, the act of state
doctrine has come under heavy criticism of late, in large part because of
the confusion that has arisen in the exchange control cases.
77
In Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger78 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit outlined a two-step test for determining if
the act of state doctrine applies. First, the court should decide if the
transaction involves an act of state. Second, the court should determine
whether the case falls into one of the recognized exceptions to the act of
state doctrine. The following analysis will discuss both of these steps,
focusing on the particular elements of the doctrine that have been at issue
in the exchange control cases under discussion here. The treatment here
is not intended to be comprehensive, and the reader should refer to the
sources cited above for more detailed discussions. 79
A. DOES THE TRANSACTION INVOLVE OR IMPLICATE
AN ACT OF STATE?
"In general, whether a particular action of a foreign state not involving
expropriation comes under the act of state doctrine depends on the extent
to which adjudication of the challenge would require the U.S. court to
intrude into the propriety of the acts and policies of the foreign govern-
ment."8 0 By the same token, when a defendant's conduct can be judged
without scrutiny of the acts or motives of the foreign government, the act
of state doctrine need not be applied. 8 1
When the defendant is not a government agency, some commentators
have correctly pointed out that a major question may exist as to whether
the case involves an act of state at all. 8 2 If one of the major reasons for
applying the doctrine is to avoid upsetting the foreign relations of the
United States, there should be no need to apply the act of state doctrine
if the foreign government's act is not questioned or implicated in the
court's analysis.
77. See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 71; Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default:
The Act of State Doctrine, Sovereign Immunity and Comity in International Business Trans-
actions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225, 252-58 (1985).
78. 745 F.2d 1500, 1534-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. See supra note 71.
80. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 469, com-
ment c.
81. Id. § 469 reporter's note 7 (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976)). Implicit in these statements is the appli-
cation of a balancing test to determine the extent of foreign relations concerns, as discussed
in Comment, supra note 71, at 558-63.
82. Bazyler, supra note 71, at 349-50, 356-57.
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Several of the cases under discussion here have dealt with this aspect
of the doctrine. In Callejo v. Bancomer 83 (a Case 2 type of action) the
Fifth Circuit dismissed an action against a government-owned Mexican
bank in a case brought by a U.S. depositor who had used dollars to
purchase certificates of deposit (CDs) held and payable in Mexico. When
the Mexican Government adopted exchange controls prohibiting with-
drawal of the funds in dollars, the depositor sued for breach of contract.
As noted previously, the court refused to dismiss on foreign sovereign
immunity grounds, holding that the Mexican bank could not benefit from
the "derivative immunity" by virtue of the fact that it was complying
with decrees that were clearly governmental in nature. 84
In considering the application of the act of state doctrine, however, the
court had another view. It dismissed the case under the doctrine, holding:
For act of state (as opposed to sovereign immunity) purposes, the relevant acts
are not merely those of the named defendants, but any governmental acts whose
validity would be called into question by adjudication of the suit. Here, although
the specific act complained of by the Callejos was Bancomer's breach of con-
tract, not Mexico's promulgation of the exchange control regulations, adjudi-
cation of the breach of contract claim would necessarily call into question the
Mexican regulations. 85
Two recent cases show that the act of state doctrine need not cause
dismissal of all causes of action related to a transaction that has been
affected by a governmental act. The best example of this is Riedel v.
Bancam. S.A., 86 which involved facts very similar to those in Callejo. In
Riedel an Ohio depositor sued for breach of a CD contract in circum-
stances identical to Callejo. The Sixth Circuit, citing Callejo, dismissed
the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract on grounds that it
implicated an act of state, the Mexican exchange controls. 87 However,
the plaintiff had also alleged breach of federal and Ohio state securities
registration laws. The court dismissed the federal claim, on the basis that
the CDs were not securities, 88 but it refused to dismiss the Ohio securities
83. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
85. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1115-16; cf. Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex,
686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1985) (tort claim based on conspiracy of defendant with Mexican
government would require court to render a determination of the legality of Mexican gov-
ernment's action in appointing an "interventor" of plaintiff), ceri. denied, 460 U.S. 1041
(1982).
86. 792 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 592.
88. The Riedel court dismissed the claim of federal securities violation, holding that the
CDs were not securities for purposes of federal securities law requirements. Id. at 593;
accord Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984). In Wolf the
court decided that investors in CDs held in Mexican banks enjoyed the protection of Mexican
Government regulations that were equivalent to those protections afforded depositors in
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law claim, holding that the " 'act of state doctrine' . . . does not bar the
Ohio securities claim. Riedel bases that claim on Bancam's failure to
register the certificate of deposit with the Ohio Division of Securities and
not on Bancam's failure to repay dollars at the certificate's maturity." 89
The court held that the CDs were securities for purposes of Ohio state
securities laws, and remanded the claim for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. 90
The implication of Riedel is that if the particular cause of action can
be seen as arising peculiarly under U.S. law, especially where the de-
fendant has availed itself of U.S. communications and other facilities to
solicit business in the United States, then the act of state doctrine should
not apply. In such a case, the foreign defendant cannot drag an act of
state (exchange control) across the border with it to immunize itself from
the protections offered to U.S. residents under U.S. law. It is precisely
in these instances that the strength of the public's interest in the appli-
cation of U.S. law predominates over potential embarrassment caused by
ignoring the act of the foreign state.
This line of reasoning is relatively untried, and few cases deal with it.
One recent case, however, Grass v. Credito Mexicano, S.A., 9 ! demon-
strates that this method of escape from the act of state doctrine applies
not just to causes of action under U.S. federal or state statutes, but also
to common law theories. Grass also involved a Case 2 type of action
brought by a Texas resident against a Mexican bank. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of claims based on
breach of contract, conversion, and federal securities laws theories, on
the authority of Callejo.92 Two of the claims raised, however, were not
precluded by the act of state doctrine. One of these, a claim of deception
under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, failed because Grass was
not a "consumer" for purposes of the act. 93 Nevertheless, the final cause
of action, for negligent misrepresentation, survived. 94
The court of appeals, in remanding the case, pointed to allegations of
misrepresentations made by defendant's agents in Texas that, if believed,
U.S. banks, and therefore the CDs lacked the risk attributes of securities. Id. at 1463-64.
This assumption was tested in West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.
1987), which involved a Case 2 transaction. As in Wolf, the court in West held that the CDs
were not securities, despite the plaintiffs' allegations that the Mexican officials did not
comply with their own laws, since such an inquiry into the operations of the foreign gov-
ernment was precluded by the act of state doctrine. Id. at 828-29.
89. 792 F.2d at 592-93.
90. Id. at 594.
91. 797 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 222.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 223.
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could have formed a basis of a common law action. As to the act of state
doctrine, the court in Grass noted that "Credito Mexicano had not shown
how the currency control regulations are directly implicated by consid-
eration of the claim. On this record, we are not convinced that adjudication
of the claim would 'involve reviewing the validity of the exchange control
regulations.' ,95 The court noted that, on remand, the district court might
wish to reexamine whether and how the exchange control regulations
would be implicated.
As Grass shows, the plaintiffs' attorneys may wish to be imaginative
in creating causes of action that are peculiarly "placed" in the United
States, with strong underlying policies to support the cause of action
(consumer protection, etc.). In such cases, a U.S. court may well decide
that the cause of action does not implicate the foreign act of state. This
conclusion is especially true when a court is willing to apply a balancing
test to determine whether foreign relations concerns require deference to
the foreign act of state. 96
Finally, it is important to note that a mere default on a contract, or
repudiation of an obligation, is not an act of state. The act of state doctrine
is generally applied only to "formal acts of sovereign authority" that are
adopted in something other than ad hoc fashion. 97
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
There are six generally recognized exceptions to the act of state doc-
trine, although the Supreme Court has not yet given its imprimatur to
each of these. The following discussion treats certain aspects of the prin-
cipal exceptions, but is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment. 98
1. The Bernstein Exception
This exception, which stems from the case of Bernstein v. N.V. Ned-
erlandische-Amerikaanische Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,99 precludes ap-
plication of the act of state doctrine in cases in which the executive branch,
through communication from the State Department, indicates that the
doctrine should not be applied. Even though the Bernstein exception has
never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court, °° it is never-
theless felt that a letter from the State Department stating that the court
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
97. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 469 re-
porter's note 3.
98. See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of Judicial Limitations
and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977).
99. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
100. See Bazyler, supra note 71, at 369-70.
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should not review a foreign act will be "highly persuasive," while a con-
trary statement (that a court should not apply the doctrine) will still allow
the court to make its own determination.' 0'
2. Cases Involving Expropriation in Violation of
International Law-The Hickenlooper Amendment
The second Hickenlooper amendment 10 2 directs that no court in the
United States shall decline to make a determination of the merits of a
case when a claim of title or other right to property is asserted based
upon a confiscation or other taking accomplished by an act of state in
violation of the principles of international law. At first glance, this statute
might appear to offer solace to creditors who wish to argue that the foreign
government's action amounted to a "taking" of the creditor's property,
thereby triggering the amendment.
Unfortunately for creditors, the amendment has only limited applica-
tion. Indeed, the amendment has been applied successfully only once: in
the remand of the Sabbatino case that inspired it. 103 To begin with, the
Hickenlooper amendment does not apply to confiscations of property that
remains in the foreign state. Only if the property, or a debt springing from
it, can be said to be "transported" to the United States does the amend-
ment become applicable. 10 4 Thus, governmental action pertaining to cer-
tificates of deposit held by foreigners-the Case 2 scenario- 05-would not
be affected by the Hickenlooper amendment.
Furthermore, opinion is divided as to whether the imposition of ex-
change controls, or other blocking legislation that does not extinguish
property rights altogether, constitutes a "taking." Several courts in Case
2 situations have held that exchange controls do not constitute a "taking"
that triggers application of the Hickenlooper amendment. '0 6 Other courts
have found, in Case I situations, 107 that the prevention of payment through
exchange control regulation does constitute a "taking."1 0 8
101. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 469 re-
porter's note 8.
102. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
103. Bazyler, supra note 71, at 393.
104. Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 463 N.E.2d 5, 10 (N.Y. 1984); RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 470 comment e; see also Bazyler,
supra note 71, at 360 n.218.
105. See cases cited supra note 3.
106. See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 831-33 (9th Cir. 1987),
discussed supra notes 28-33; Braka v. Multibanco Comermex, 589 F. Supp. 802, 804 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Braka v. Bancomer, 589 F. Supp. 1465, 1472-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 762
F.2d 222, 224 n.1 (2d Cir. 1985).
107. See cases cited supra note 2.
108. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n.3 (2d Cir. 1985)(dictum, not involving analysis of Hickenlooper); Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de
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Finally, by its own terms, the Hickenlooper amendment does not apply
in respect to a claim acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit
of not more than 180 days' duration issued in good faith prior to the time
of the confiscation. A bank issuer of a letter of credit is therefore able to
plead the act of state defense when a foreign government seizes assets
and liabilities of the issuer in the foreign country, and the beneficiary of
the draft attempts to collect at the issuer's home office. 109
3. Commercial Activities Exception
Even though many have argued for the adoption of a commercial ac-
tivities exception to the act of state doctrine to provide symmetry with
the FSIA, a majority of the Supreme Court has never adopted such an
exception.'10 In Braka v. Bancomer the Second Circuit alluded to the
plaintiff's argument in this respect, but held that the act involved (the
adoption of exchange controls) was governmental, not commercial.Il
The court could then "leave for another day consideration of the possible
existence in this Circuit of a commercial exception to the act of state
doctrine under Dunhill."" t2
Even if a court applies a commercial activity exception, the scope of
the exception would not necessarily be coextensive with the commercial
activities exception under the FSIA. The courts may develop a narrower
exception to the act of state doctrine, giving deference to strong govern-
mental interests in economic matters.1 1 3
4. Treaty Exception
The treaty exception derives from Justice Harlan's statement in Sab-
batino that the act of state doctrine should not be applied if the issue is
governed by a "treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding con-
Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (not, however, applying the analysis
to the Hickenlooper amendment).
109. See the discussion in RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra
note 10, § 470 reporter's note 7.
110. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 684 (1976),
only four Justices (White, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist) concurred in the application of
a commercial activity exception to the act of state doctrine.
In 1986 a bill was introduced during the 99th Congress (H.R. 3137) to amend the FSIA,
by including, among other amendments, a provision to bar application of the act of state
doctrine in expropriation, breach of contract, and arbitration cases. See Feldman, Amending
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The ABA Position, 20 INT'L LAW. 1289, 1295 (1986).
The bill was never released from committee, and no such legislation has yet been introduced
in the 100th Congress.
I II. 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 225.
113. See Comment, supra note 71, at 565-66.
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trolling legal principles." ' 1 4 The exception devotes its existence at least
in part to the notion that one of the reasons for removing courts from
such cases has to do with the lack of consensus on many principles of
international law that would have to be analyzed by the courts. Given
these vagaries, courts prefer to defer to diplomacy by the executive branch.
This is another example of an exception that has not received the full
sanction of the United States Supreme Court. It was nevertheless con-
sidered by the Fifth Circuit in Callejo v. Bancomer, since the plaintiffs
there argued that the act of state doctrine should not apply when the
Mexican Government's act (the imposition of exchange controls) violated
its obligations under the IMF Agreement."l 5 After a lengthy discussion,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to show a clear case for a violation;
indeed, the court noted that the director of the Fund's legal department
had written a letter that established at least prima facie evidence that
Mexico was in compliance with its IMF obligations. 1 6 Given the sub-
stantial uncertainty regarding the entire area of compliance, the court
expressed doubt that this case presented the type of "unambiguous agree-
ment" referred to in Sabbatino.117
The issue of Mexico's compliance with the obligations of article VIII,
section 2(a) of the Fund Agreement is problematical, 1 8 and compliance
or noncompliance is difficult to gauge. The Fund itself has taken a very
pragmatic approach to exchange controls, and has not attempted to apply
the article VIII obligations with surgical precision. The letter from the
Fund's legal officer should be seen less as an authoritative interpretation
that certain acts by Mexico were in compliance with the Fund Agreement,
and more as a statement that the Fund was willing to overlook technical
violations. 119
After Callejo, it is worthwhile for a creditor in a Case 2 situation to
argue that the exchange controls that were imposed violated the govern-
ment's obligations under the Fund Agreement. If so, the treaty exception
could be used to preclude application of the act of state doctrine. The
debtor's response is to obtain a letter from the Fund stating that the
exchange controls were maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund
Agreement. ' 20
114. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
115. 764 F.2d at 1117.
116. Id. at 1119-20.
117. Id. at 1118-19.
118. Zamora, supra note 53, at 108-21.
119. But cf. 3 J. GOLD, supra note 35, at 646-58 (discussing the procedures for Fund
certification in this regard).
120. Cf. id. at 654-55.
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5. Territorial Exceptions to the Act of
State Doctrine; Rules of Debt Situs
Principles of territorial sovereignty have figured importantly in the dis-
cussion of recent act of state cases. The territorial limitations on the
doctrine spring, once again, from Justice Harlan's opinion in Sabbatino,
precluding examination of the validity of a taking of property "within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government."121 Conversely, there-
fore, a court will not apply the doctrine when the foreign government
undertakes acts that affect property located beyond its borders. 122 These
conclusions are extensions of the Sabbatino principle; as of this date, the
United States Supreme Court has yet to pass on the applicability of the
act of state doctrine to an act of a foreign government in respect to
property located outside that state's territory. 123 Nevertheless, numerous
other courts have applied territorial limitations to the doctrine.124
The territorial limitation seems a logical one in cases that involve the
expropriation of tangible property. Where intangible property is con-
cerned, however, the limitation gives rise to numerous possibilities of
confusion, due to the indefinite "situs" of intangible property and the
difficulties courts have had in placing property in one jurisdiction or an-
other. When the act of state involves exchange control, rather than a
taking of property, the issue is doubly confused: not only are intangible
assets in dispute; in addition, courts must wrestle with a lack of unanimity
among authorities concerning the extraterritorial limits on government
regulation.
Those courts that have considered the territorial limitations of the doc-
trine have resorted to several different tests for determining the situs of
intangible property, and therefore the applicability of the doctrine. 125 The
first two tests discussed below represent somewhat traditional, mechan-
ical approaches. The third test, which is relatively new, appears to be
more suited to the underlying principles for which the act of state doctrine
was adopted, and appears to be the test that some courts, especially those
in the Fifth Circuit, will apply in the future to such cases.
121. 376 U.S. at 428.
122. Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966) (attempt by revolutionary government to seize a custodial account in
New York belonging to King Faisel 11).
123. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 10, § 469 com-
ment b.
124. See Note, supra note I.
125. The following analysis is partly drawn from Note, supra note 1, at 596-605, and
Note, supra note 35, at 926-28.
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First, a number of courts have held that if a foreign state has something
akin to physical control over a debt at the time that the government acts,
then the act cannot be reviewed under the act of state doctrine. For
instance, courts have held that if a debt is payable in a state at the time
of its confiscation, such that the foreign state could enforce payment of
it within its territory, then the debt has "situs" there, and a foreign state
that expropriates such a debt has the power to do so and the act cannot
be reviewed under the act of state doctrine. 126 This has been called the
"complete fruition requirement" by one commentator, because it depends
on bringing to complete fruition the power to enforce the debt within the
government's territory. 127 Conversely, if the government does not have
the power to enforce the debt, due to lack of jurisdiction over the debtor
or because the debt is payable elsewhere, then the debt must lack situs
there. 128 This test, placing the situs wherever the debt is enforceable, is
the principal test that, with variations, has been used by most federal
courts.
Second, there is some authority for the proposition that the situs of the
debt can be placed wherever the state has jurisdiction over the debtor. 129
Finally, some courts have rejected both the power to enforce/complete
fruition test, and the jurisdiction over the debtor test, in cases such as
these. 130 In Callejo v. Bancomer the Fifth Circuit expressed dissatisfaction
with the mechanical approach of the previous tests. Judge Goldberg noted
that the complete fruition test, based on power to enforce or collect a
126. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v, Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d Cir.
1985) ("In this case, Costa Rica could not wholly extinguish the Costa Rican bank's obli-
gation to timely pay United States dollars to Allied in New York. Thus the situs of the debt
was not Costa Rica."); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 463 N.E.2d 5, 9 (N.Y. 1984) (act
of state doctrine precluded inquiry into propriety of confiscation of debt that was payable
in Cuba at time of expropriation; "Only when a debt or other obligation is not payable at
all in the confiscating State would the Act of State doctrine be inapplicable.").
127. Note, supra note I, at 596.
128. See Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714-16 (5th
Cir. 1966) (account receivable, arising out of expropriated property, was payable in the
United States; court held that Cuban government lacked power to enforce the debt, and
act of state doctrine did not apply) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
129. See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), discussed
in Note, supra note I, at 598-600; see also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
130. Several courts have noted that in many debt cases the debt can be enforced in
multiple jurisdictions, and could therefore be said to have multiple situs. Perez v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 463 N.E.2d 5, 9 (N.Y. 1984). In Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court pointed out that in many cases
the creditor can sue the debtor in the debtor's home state, which would therefore have the
power to compel the indigenous debtor to pay his debt. Nevertheless, a United States court
might also find that the situs of the debt was in the United States at the time of the alleged
confiscation. Id.
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debt, is not an adequate test of determining the situs of debts for act of
state purposes. Since Mexico can always enforce the collection of debts
owed by its own banks, the act of state doctrine under such a test would
allow a foreign state to seize debts of its own banks no matter how many
ties the debt has to the United States. -[T]he fact that a debt can be
enforced by the creditor in one forum should not be the basis of depriving
him of his ability to enforce the debt in a different forum. Otherwise, the
sword of the creditor would become the shield for the debtor."' 13 1
Instead, the court in Callejo applied a test that will likely become
increasingly popular, not just in the Fifth Circuit but elsewhere as well.
According to Judge Goldberg, "the proper test for determining situs is
where the incidents of the debt, as a whole, place it."' 132 Among the
"incidents" to be given weight are the following: the place where a deposit
is carried; the place of payment; the intention of the parties regarding
applicable law; and the involvement of the U.S. banking system in the
transaction.
This approach focuses on policy considerations rather than on me-
chanical formulae relating to debt situs. As stated by Judge Goldberg:
Together, these factors help us to determine the extent of the foreign govern-
ment's interest in the debt. They therefore help to answer the ultimate question
in the act of state context: Are the ties of the debt to the foreign country
sufficiently close that we will antagonize the foreign government by not rec-
ognizing its acts? 33
This "incidents of the debt" test seems much better suited to the under-
lying rationale of the act of state doctrine than do the other tests mentioned
above. 13 4
On the particular facts of Callejo, the incidents of the debt clearly placed
them in Mexico, and therefore the court dismissed the case on the grounds
of act of state. Applying the same "incidents of the debt" approach in
other cases, such as Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago, 135 however, the result would be one with which most bankers
131. 764 F.2d at 1123.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1124. For a discussion of the relevant factors to be considered in determining
situs, see Note, Resolution ofAct of State Disputes, supra note 71, at 930 n. 150. The author
also suggests two subsidiary rules, based on underlying policies, that would apply to cases
where a situs-based rule would indicate that more than one country has prescriptive juris-
diction over the debt. Id. at 931-33.
134. Accord Note, supra note i, at 611-16.
135. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). In Allied Bank, a Case I example, the district court
dismissed the action on authority of the act of state doctrine. The court of appeals upheld
the dismissal, but for a different reason: international comity required that the actions of
the Costa Rican Government be recognized. The court of appeals then reversed itself on
rehearing, holding that neither comity nor the act of state doctrine dictated dismissal. The
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could live. Thus, as several commentators have noted, when a debt is
clearly payable in the United States, and the debtor has submitted to
jurisdiction here, then the territorial limitation of the act of state doctrine
will generally place the situs in the United States, and a U.S. court need
not defer to the foreign government's act. 136 The same result would be
obtained under the incidents of the debt approach. The creditor who fails
to heed the precautions implied in this, by failing to include suitable
provisions in the contract, does so at his own risk.
V. Comity
The doctrine of comity that reared its head in the first Allied Bank
decision by the Second Circuit 137 has not disappeared, even though the
Second Circuit, on rehearing, reversed itself and directed the district court
to assert jurisdiction.138 That doctrine, which is based upon the coinci-
dence of U.S. policy with the policies exercised by the foreign state,
remains a viable doctrine. Thus, as the court in Allied Bank pointed out
on rehearing, acts of foreign governments that fall outside the act of state
doctrine (e.g., for reasons of territorial limitation) should be recognized
by courts only if they are consistent with the law and policy of the United
States. 139 With the aid of an amicus brief from the U.S. Government
pointing out the court's misinterpretation of U.S. policy, the Second Cir-
cuit determined that, upon reflection, Costa Rica's unilateral imposition
of exchange controls to solve its own debt crisis was not consistent with
U.S. policy. It will take an unusual case for a court to apply the comity
doctrine to give effect to foreign exchange controls, especially when the
debtor has failed to establish one of the three other defenses discussed
in this outline.
court found the situs of the debt to be clearly placed in the United States, where payment
in dollars was required to the U.S. creditor. Id.
The saga of Allied Bank has been well documented by a host of critics. See e.g., Gold,
Exchange Control: Act of State, Public Policy, The IMF's Articles ofAgreement, and Other
Complications, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13 (1984); Rendell, supra note 15; Zaitzeff & Kunz,
The Act of State Doctrine and Allied Bank, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985); Note, The Act of
State Doctrine and Allied Bank, 31 VILL. L. REV. 291 (1986); see also the commentators
cited supra note 71.
136. Rendell, supra note 15, at 823 n.13; RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(REVISED), supra note 10, § 469 reporter's note 4 ("The prevailing U.S. view appears to
be that when a loan is expressly made payable and enforceable in a place outside of the
debtor's domicile, the debt is situated at the place chosen, and thus cannot be defeated by
application of the act of state doctrine to preclude review of a prohibition against payment
by the state of the debtor's domicile." (citing Weston, Libra Bank, and Allied Bank)).
137. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984)
(opinion deleted in final reports).
138. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
139. Id. at 522.
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VI. What Rule Is Best for the International Economy?
This article has attempted to gauge the receptivity of courts in the
United States to three legal doctrines by which a court in this country
can give some effect or recognition to exchange controls adopted by a
foreign government. While few debtors have succeeded in defending them-
selves from creditors' suits with the shield of exchange controls, the cases
demonstrate that U.S. courts will give some limited recognition to such
governmental acts. Ironically, the doctrine that has been least used by
the U.S. courts in providing recognition has been article VIII, section
2(b) of the IMF Agreement-a provision that was adopted expressly for
this purpose. There is not a single reported case in which a U.S. court
has used this provision to refuse enforcement of a contract.
In all of these cases there is a notable lack of any discussion about
what rule would be best for the international economy. Admittedly, it is
probably not for the courts to decide what rule would be best for the
international monetary system as a whole. Nevertheless, it is relevant to
ask whether the extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of exchange
controls should depend on the application of general legal doctrines such
as those discussed here, or whether more precise rules, tailored to inter-
national monetary realities, should be adopted. What set of rules would
work best to promote an open world economy, but one in which govern-
ments have the power necessary to avoid severe dislocations caused by
capital flows? It may be that such rules would include a measure of
international enforcement of exchange controls. A coherent solution in
this regard is not likely to come from the U.S. courts, but rather from
amendment to the IMF Agreement, or from other cooperative agreements
that will become increasingly necessary in an electronically linked, global
financial market.
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